Iranian media and hardline political circles are increasingly portraying the Strait of Hormuz not only as a critical energy corridor, but also as a strategic route for global internet communications. According to recent discussions in Tehran, Iran may seek greater oversight over the submarine data cables running beneath the vital waterway, raising new concerns about the future of digital infrastructure security in the Gulf region.
The debate comes amid heightened tensions between Iran, the United States and several Gulf states following recent military confrontations around the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian commentators and lawmakers argue that the undersea cables crossing the strait could become a new source of geopolitical leverage for Tehran, similar to the role the waterway already plays in global oil transportation.
For decades, the Strait of Hormuz has been considered one of the world’s most strategically important maritime chokepoints, with nearly one-fifth of global seaborne oil shipments passing through it. Now, Iranian hardline media outlets are expanding that narrative to include digital infrastructure, emphasizing the growing dependence of the global economy on submarine internet cables.
On May 8, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-linked Fars News Agency published a report describing undersea internet cables as a potential strategic pressure tool. These cables carry communications and financial data between Europe, the Middle East and Asia. According to telecommunications provider Tata Communications, several major cable networks — including Falcon, GBI and TGN-Gulf — pass through the Strait of Hormuz, connecting Gulf states with global communication systems.
The TGN-Gulf network, in particular, links Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia to international data infrastructure. Iranian media argue that major technology companies such as Google, Meta and Microsoft rely heavily on these networks, while the SWIFT international financial system also depends on uninterrupted submarine cable connectivity.
Fars News stated that while oil was the most important strategic resource of the twentieth century, data has become the defining asset of the twenty-first century. Another IRGC-affiliated outlet, Mashregh News, described the submarine cables as “Iran’s silent weapon,” claiming that they could create vulnerabilities for the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) and its regional allies.
Iranian officials have recently indicated that Tehran is reassessing its regional security strategy, accusing certain Gulf states of assisting U.S. military operations in the region. Against this backdrop, discussions surrounding “digital and economic pressure” through Hormuz have gained increasing attention.
Iranian parliament member Ehsan Ghazizadeh Hashemi told the state-run IRNA news agency on May 2 that lawmakers are preparing a new “action plan” concerning submarine cables in Hormuz and surrounding waters. According to him, any installation, maintenance, operation or rerouting of undersea cables in the area could require prior approval from the Iranian government. He also suggested that Iran could impose service charges on such infrastructure projects.
Analysts note that submarine cables now form the backbone of the global economy. Reuters recently reported that nearly 99 percent of international internet traffic travels through submarine cable systems. Research firm TeleGeography has identified several major networks crossing Hormuz, including EAA-1, Falcon and Gulf Bridge International. Any major disruption in the region could therefore affect internet services, banking systems and commercial operations across the Middle East and beyond.
Fars News also cited international estimates suggesting that trillions of dollars in financial transactions are processed daily through these undersea networks. The outlet argued that disruption to such infrastructure could result in severe economic losses within days, turning submarine cables into not just a technical issue but also a matter of national security and geopolitics.
Iranian hardline commentators, however, have not openly called for cutting or seizing the cables. Instead, their focus has been on imposing regulations, oversight and usage fees. They argue that because parts of the Strait of Hormuz fall within Iranian territorial waters, Tehran has legal grounds to exercise sovereignty over infrastructure passing through the area. Proposed measures reportedly include mandatory permits for cable installation, fees for cable transit and greater Iranian involvement in repair and maintenance operations.
Submarine cables are typically constructed with fiber-optic strands protected by layers of steel, insulation and polyethylene to withstand pressure and environmental damage. Repairing damaged cables is often expensive and time-consuming, particularly in conflict zones where repair ships require secure access and political clearance. Iranian media claim that foreign technology companies operating in the region may eventually have to comply with Iranian regulations regarding such infrastructure.
Despite these claims, international maritime law may not support Iran’s broader interpretation of sovereignty over global digital infrastructure. Western powers, including the United States and European countries, are unlikely to accept unilateral Iranian control or taxation over international data flows. Furthermore, submarine cable systems are governed by complex agreements involving governments and private companies, making direct interference potentially costly diplomatically and economically.
Still, analysts say the significance lies in the fact that the discussion is happening openly. It reflects how Tehran may be exploring alternative methods of strategic pressure beyond conventional military confrontation. By bringing digital infrastructure into the geopolitical equation, Iranian hardliners appear to be signaling that future conflicts in the region may extend beyond oil tankers and naval routes into cyberspace and global communications networks as well.