The Middle East now stands on the brink of a volcano—over the past six weeks, the devastating conflict involving Iran, Israel, and the United States has shaken the entire region; the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, surging oil market instability, and the near-collapse of regional security structures have created a deeply volatile situation—but perhaps the most surprising element is the role of Saudi Arabia, which has neither directly entered the war nor fully abandoned Iran; Riyadh’s policy of “wait and observe” reflects a calculated strategy—it is not aligning with Iran like Oman, nor is it becoming a staunch ally of Israel like the United Arab Emirates; after the 2019 attacks on its oil facilities by Houthi forces and what it perceived as a weak response from Washington, Saudi Arabia realized that U.S. security guarantees are no longer as reliable as before, prompting it to pursue strategic autonomy—on one hand, it has restored relations with Iran through mediation by China, and on the other, it has strengthened defense cooperation with Pakistan; Riyadh is no longer willing to accept dominance by either Israel or Iran, instead seeking a balanced regional order in which it plays a leading role; its primary concern remains the Iran-backed Houthi movement, as direct involvement in an anti-Iran war could disrupt oil exports through the Red Sea and severely undermine its ambitious Vision 2030 agenda, which is why it is quietly pursuing de-escalation through diplomatic channels, particularly via Pakistan; however, if Iran were to directly target Saudi infrastructure, Riyadh would not remain silent—in fact, it is already working to form a potential military axis with Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan, a coalition that could significantly alter the course of the conflict; the Gaza war has further reshaped Saudi calculations, making normalization with Israel nearly impossible under current public pressure; Israel wants Saudi Arabia to fully align against Iran, while Iran insists that Saudi territory must not be used as a base for U.S. military operations; in this complex environment, Riyadh is searching for a strategic equilibrium where no single power can dominate the region; at the same time, it is moving toward building a broader security framework within the Muslim world—combining Pakistan’s nuclear capability and missile technology, Turkey’s advanced drone systems, and Egypt’s large military forces into a new defensive architecture that sends a clear message not only to Iran, but also to Israel and the United States: Saudi Arabia is now prepared to ensure its own security; history shows that geography cannot be changed—Iran and Saudi Arabia will remain neighbors, leaving them with two choices: destructive conflict or constructive coexistence; if Saudi Arabia succeeds in its current balancing strategy, it may emerge from this crisis not merely as an oil-rich state, but as a rising global power.
Saudi Arabia is disoriented by Iran’s rise in the Middle East
